Kansas Allows Strict Liability Claims Against Used-Product Sellers in Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co.: Why the Third Restatement Is a Better Approach by Nelson, Rachel E.
 
1179 
Kansas Allows Strict Liability Claims Against 
Used-Product Sellers in Gaumer v. Rossville Truck 
& Tractor Co.: Why the Third Restatement Is a 
Better Approach* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In modern products liability law, the doctrine of strict liability in tort 
is generally considered the principal theory of recovery for consumers 
who are injured by defective products.1  Under strict liability, a party is 
responsible for injuries caused by defective products that have been sold 
to consumers.2  The traditional rule is that strict liability applies only to 
defects in new products, but not used products.3  For more than four 
decades, courts have been divided over whether strict liability should 
apply to sellers of used goods.4 
The Kansas Supreme Court recently held in Gaumer v. Rossville 
Truck & Tractor Co. that Kansas law permits a strict liability action 
against the seller of a used product.5  This decision is misguided.  
Subjecting used-product sellers to strict liability claims under all 
circumstances is inappropriate because the policy considerations that 
have traditionally supported strict liability do not similarly support 
imposing strict liability on secondhand dealers and used-product sellers.  
Instead, the Gaumer court should have followed section 8 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which provides a better 
approach for determining when to allow strict liability claims against  
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 1. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.1 (2005). 
 2. PAUL SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER § 7.10 (1981). 
 3. See discussion infra Part II.D.1–2. 
 4. See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Products Liability: Application of Strict Liability 
Doctrine to Seller of Used Product, 9 A.L.R.5th 1 (1993 & Supp. 2010) (collecting cases and noting 
the divergent views of courts nationally).  Compare Turner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (subjecting used-product seller to strict liability), with Tillman v. Vance 
Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1979) (declining to subject a used-product seller to strict liability). 
 5. Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co., 257 P.3d 292, 308 (Kan. 2011). 
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used-product sellers.  In Gaumer, the Kansas Supreme Court failed to 
consider the Third Restatement approach. 
This Comment explains that the Third Restatement is a better 
approach for courts to follow because it provides a compromise in 
determining when to subject used-product sellers to strict liability.  
Additionally, it explains why the policy justifications that have 
conventionally supported imposing strict liability on all parties in the 
chain of distribution do not similarly support imposing strict liability on 
used-product sellers in all circumstances. 
This Comment begins by outlining the development of the doctrine 
of strict liability in tort6 and the policy considerations that have 
traditionally supported the doctrine.7  Next, it describes how courts 
originally addressed strict liability and used-product sellers, and it 
outlines the current split among courts,8 including the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gaumer that allows strict liability claims against 
used-product sellers.9 
Part III examines the court’s reasoning in Gaumer and proposes that 
courts follow the Third Restatement in determining when to impose strict 
liability on used-product sellers.10  It further explains why the policy 
justifications that support strict liability do not similarly support strict 
liability for used-product sellers.11  This Comment concludes that strict 
liability is inappropriate for used-product sellers under all circumstances 
and argues that the Third Restatement, which provides a theory of 
limited strict liability for secondhand sellers, is the appropriate solution 
to this increasingly prevalent products liability concern.12 
II. BACKGROUND 
Products liability law is a mixture of tort law and contract law.13  The 
elements derived from tort law—negligence, strict liability, and deceit—
developed primarily based on common law.14  The elements borrowed 
                                                          
 6. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.D.1–2. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.D.3. 
 10. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 12. See discussion infra Part III.A–C. 
 13. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN A NUT SHELL § 1.1 (8th ed. 2008). 
 14. Id. 
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from contract law developed largely through common law warranties as 
codified under the Uniform Commercial Code.15  Because of the 
interrelatedness of these separate areas of law that encompass products 
liability law, “plaintiffs often have a variety of available claims” when a 
product injures a consumer.16  This section will begin by explaining the 
early obstacles that consumers faced in recovering under a products 
liability claim.17  It will then discuss how strict liability developed in the 
United States, including the adoption of section 402 of the Second 
Restatement and section 8 of the Third Restatement.18  This section 
concludes by examining the public policies that support strict liability19 
and the current jurisdictional split on when to impose strict liability on 
secondhand or used-product sellers.20 
A. The Early Obstacles to Recovery Under Products Liability Law 
Prior to the adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (Second Restatement), injured consumers had “bleak prospects for 
recovery.”21  For defective products, a plaintiff could rely on negligence 
or breach of implied warranty theories.22  For misrepresentation of a 
product’s condition or quality, a plaintiff could file an action for fraud, 
negligent representation, or breach of express warranty.23  But all 
theories posed serious obstacles to recovery because of “the privity 
requirement, undue burdens in proving negligence, and other contract 
barriers such as notice, disclaimer, and limitations of remedy.”24 
Initially, courts required plaintiffs to show privity of contract with 
the manufacturer.25  Even though this requirement eroded in negligence 
actions after the seminal case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,26 most 
plaintiffs still struggled to prove negligence from an evidentiary 
                                                          
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 21. William E. Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the New Restatement of Products 
Liability: Strict Liability Versus Products Liability, KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, Fall 1998, at 1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 2 n.6 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)). 
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standpoint.27  To win a negligence claim, for example, a plaintiff must 
prove fault on the part of the manufacturer.  Specifically, a plaintiff must 
prove that a manufacturer acted in an unreasonable manner during the 
manufacturing process, thus creating a defective product.  Then a 
plaintiff must prove that the defect was the actual and proximate cause of 
plaintiff’s injuries or damages.  This was difficult to prove because there 
was not likely any direct evidence of negligence in the manufacturing 
process.28  Further, the increasingly modern and complex methods of 
manufacturing and distribution that involve multiple producers only 
exacerbated a plaintiff’s burden.29  Even if the evidence were available, a 
plaintiff often may not be able to access it or afford the litigation costs.30 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.—the same case that abolished the 
privity requirement for negligence claims—greatly restricted the privity 
requirement for warranty actions.31  Previously, courts required a 
plaintiff to establish privity of contract between the plaintiff and the 
manufacturer or seller.32  This essentially meant that if a person had not 
purchased the product directly from the manufacturer, then he could not 
sue the manufacturer and had no possible cause of action.33  This made it 
particularly difficult for consumers when manufacturers began 
distributing their products to users “through networks of independent 
wholesalers and retailers.”34  Following MacPherson, however, courts 
began to recognize a consumer’s right to sue a “remote” manufacturer 
for negligence35 because a negligence claim depended on the 
“foreseeability of risk, not on a contractual relationship between the 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. (describing the difficulty of proving where a defect occurred when multiple 
companies and stages of manufacture are involved). 
 30. See id. (explaining that the “plaintiff often lived far from the place of manufacture” and that 
“[t]he plaintiff’s lawyer was more likely than not a sole practitioner with limited resources to pursue 
a distant manufacturer”). 
 31. 111 N.E. 1050.  The implied warranty of merchantability is the warranty that is based on 
defectiveness, U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977), and parallels negligence and strict liability.  Express 
warranties parallel misrepresentation and section 402 of the Second Restatement.  Warranty 
obstacles include privity under U.C.C. § 2-318, notice under U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a), disclaimer of 
warranty protection under U.C.C. § 2-316, limitation of the available remedies under U.C.C. § 2-
719, and a statute of limitations running from the date of sale with no discovery rule. 
 32. Westerbeke, supra note 21, at 2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  The MacPherson rule was almost universally adopted throughout the United States.  See 
Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946). 
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parties.”36  Therefore, courts eventually recognized a consumer’s right to 
sue a remote manufacturer under breach of warranty when the product, 
“if defectively made, would be unreasonably dangerous to users or 
consumers of the product.”37  In response, manufacturers started finding 
ways to get around the warranty through disclaimers and limitations of 
remedies.38 
A possible solution to privity and proof obstacles was an action for 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability under contract law.39  
Under an implied warranty of merchantability theory, “the issue was not 
whether the defective condition resulted from the seller’s negligence, but 
simply whether the defective condition rendered the product unfit for its 
ordinary purposes.”40  Liability was strict because fault was completely 
irrelevant to a breach of implied warranty claim.41  An implied warranty 
action was still generally unavailable, however, because sellers were 
protected in most circumstances by a variety of limitations on warranty 
liability.42  The theory of strict liability eventually eliminated these 
hurdles, in the interest of protecting consumers, by allowing them to 
recover damages for injuries caused by sellers of defective goods. 
B. The Development of Strict Liability in Tort for Product Defects 
Strict products liability in tort did not emerge in U.S. courts until the 
1960s.43  It arose to alleviate product-safety concerns that stemmed from 
the modernization of manufacturing and distribution processes.44  It also 
lightened the constraints that traditional products liability claims placed 
on injured plaintiffs.45  The development and expansion of the doctrine  
                                                          
 36. Westerbeke, supra note 21, at 2. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.1. 
 44. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring) (en banc) (explaining that “public policy demands that responsibility be 
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market”). 
 45. See supra Part II.A. 
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of strict liability in tort became the “centerpiece around which the rest of 
modern products liability law was formed.”46 
1. Recognizing the Doctrine of Strict Products Liability in Tort 
The doctrine of strict products liability was first recognized and 
applied in 1963 in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.47  In this 
landmark case, the California Supreme Court held that “[a] manufacturer 
is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing 
that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect 
that causes injury to a human being.”48  Justice Traynor explained that 
product liability claims should not be governed by the law of contract 
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.49  The rules that define 
and govern warranties were “developed to meet the needs of commercial 
transactions [and] cannot properly be invoked to govern the 
manufacturer’s liability to those injured by their defective products 
unless those rules also serve the purposes for which such liability is 
imposed.”50  Strict liability, the court opined, protects injured consumers 
by forcing manufacturers to cover the costs of injuries that result from 
defective products that they put on the market because consumers are 
“powerless to protect themselves” from these injuries.51 
The California Supreme Court had laid the foundation for Greenman 
with its 1944 opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno.52  
In Escola, Justice Traynor opined that public policy demands that 
manufacturers, who can “most effectively reduce the hazards to life and 
health inherent in defective products,” should bear the responsibility of 
compensating those who suffer injury from defective products.53  The 
year following Greenman, the California Supreme Court, in Vandermark 
v. Ford Motor Co., further extended strict liability from manufacturers to 
all parties involved in the manufacturing, distribution, and sale of 
defective products, including retailers.54  Justice Traynor explained that 
                                                          
 46. OWEN, supra note 13, § 5.1. 
 47. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en banc). 
 48. Id. at 900. 
 49. Id. at 901. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. at 440. 
 54. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964) (en banc). 
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retailers, just like manufacturers, engage in distributing goods to the 
public and therefore play an “integral” role in the producing and 
marketing enterprise.55  He explained that they should “bear the cost of 
injuries” that might result from defective products because they might 
quite possibly be the only party that an injured plaintiff can hold liable 
for his injuries.56 
2. Defining “Strict” Liability 
Strict liability rests on the policy that a manufacturer or seller should 
bear responsibility for a consumer’s losses or injuries that the 
manufacturer or seller caused.57  It does not consider the defendant’s 
behavior but, rather, evaluates the “nature of the allegedly defective 
product.”58  It is “strict” because it applies even though a seller has 
exercised all possible reasonable care in preparing the sale of a product, 
thus allowing a consumer to receive compensation for injuries caused by 
a defective product regardless of the defendant’s fault.59 
Strict liability, as originally outlined in section 402A of the Second 
Restatement, applied to manufacturing, design, and warning defects.60  It 
also used the consumer-expectations test for defectiveness.61  This test 
paralleled the concept underlying the implied warranty of 
merchantability, which essentially protects consumers against hidden 
dangers.62  Section 2 of the Third Restatement, however, reformulated 
the doctrine of strict liability.63  The Third Restatement supersedes 
section 402A and allows strict liability only for claims of manufacturing 
defects by using what is in essence a negligence test for design and 
                                                          
 55. Id. at 171. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See FRANK J. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 43 (1989). 
 58. Karl A. Boedecker & Fred W. Morgan, Strict Liability for Sellers of Used Products: A 
Conceptual Rationale and Current Status, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 178, 179 (1993). 
 59. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmts. a, 
c (1965). 
 60. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmt. i (1965); see also infra notes 179–81 
and accompanying text. 
 62. The implied warranty of merchantability, outlined in U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977), recognizes 
some limited warranty protection for buyers of used goods.  The buyer and seller, however, may 
allocate risks in the transaction using disclaimers or limitations of remedy.  See U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-
317. 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 
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warning defects.64  Under this new framework, there are four main 
situations for which strict liability is the only method to hold a party 
liable: (1) manufacturing defects where the plaintiff cannot prove fault 
on the part of the party that caused the defect; (2) design defects where 
the danger exists and is known, but the product provides benefits and 
there is no known alternative design that would eliminate or reduce the 
danger involved with the first product;65 (3) design defects with 
unforeseeable, scientifically undiscoverable dangers; and (4) warning 
defects with unforeseeable, scientifically undiscoverable dangers.  For all 
of these situations, a reasonable manufacturer or seller could not have 
used any more care, so liability was truly “strict.” 
3. Adopting Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
In 1965, the American Law Institute (ALI) published the theory of 
strict liability in section 402A of the Second Restatement.66  By the mid-
1970s, more than forty states had adopted the theory of strict liability for 
manufacturers in tort for the sale of defective products.67  As of 2005, 
only five states had formally rejected the doctrine of strict liability under 
section 402A.68  Section 402A(1) states: 
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if 
 (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, 
and 
 (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.69 
The Second Restatement does not distinguish among manufacturing, 
design, and warning defects—it simply applies to any product with a 
                                                          
 64. Id. § 2(a)–(c). 
 65. This situation is common for problems with prescription drugs, where the drug is 
unavoidably unsafe but can still justifiably be given because there is no alternative drug available.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k. 
 66. Id. § 402A. 
 67. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.3. 
 68. Id.  The five states that have formally rejected the doctrine of strict products liability in tort 
are Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia.  Id.  These states essentially 
apply many of the principles outlined in section 402A either through the law of warranty or the law 
of negligence.  Id. 
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1). 
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defective condition that is “unreasonably dangerous” to the consumer.70  
Section 402A goes on to state that subsection 1 of the rule applies even if 
“the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of 
his product.”71  It thus allows a strict liability claim without proof of 
fault.  The section also allows liability even if the consumer did not buy 
the product from or enter into a contract with the seller.72  This provision 
abolishes the privity of contract requirement that courts had previously 
required.73  Section 402A also states that any seller who is “engaged in 
the business of selling such a product” can be held strictly liable.74  This 
is commonly referred to as the “chain of distribution” theory.75  Any 
party that participates in the product’s chain of distribution—including a 
manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, dealer, distributor, or restaurant 
operator—may face strict liability.76  The underlying rationale for section 
402A was that a “seller, by marketing his product . . . , has undertaken 
and assumed a special responsibility” towards the general public, and he 
must bear the burden of accidental injuries that might be caused by his 
products.77  The Second Restatement makes no distinction between new 
and used products,78 and the comments to section 402A fail to discuss or 
mention used products.  Since the adoption of this section, products 
liability law “has moved far beyond the original formulation of the 
doctrine as described in [section] 402A and its comments.”79 
4. Adopting Section 8 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability 
In 1998, the ALI published section 8 of the Third Restatement80 to 
“organize, clarify and restate thirty years of case law” decided under 
section 402A of the Second Restatement.81  Section 8 largely dismantles 
                                                          
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. § 402A(2)(a). 
 72. Id. § 402A(2)(b). 
 73. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.3. 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a). 
 75. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 776 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) 
(“[Strict] liability is extended to those in the chain of distribution.”). 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f. 
 77. Id. § 402A cmt. c. 
 78. See id. § 402A(1)(a) (“One who sells any product . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 79. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.3. 
 80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 (1998). 
 81. Westerbeke, supra note 21, at 1. 
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section 402A and essentially abandons strict liability for design and 
warning cases, which comprised much of products liability litigation 
prior to the adoption of section 402A in 1965.82  It therefore governs only 
manufacturing defects.  Section 8 directly addresses used products, 
subjecting any party who is in the chain of distribution for a used product 
to liability for a defect that harms a consumer if (a) the defect is a result 
of “the seller’s failure to exercise reasonable care,”83 (b) the seller 
markets a product with a manufacturing defect in a way that would lead a 
reasonable buyer to expect that the used product “present[ed] no greater 
risk of defect than if the product were new,”84 (c) the defect is a 
manufacturing defect in a remanufactured product,85 or (d) the defect 
results from a used product’s noncompliance with a product safety 
statute or regulation.86 
Although the ALI published section 8 to clarify section 402A, most 
states continue to base their products liability law solely on section 
402A.87  Section 402A has caused confusion for courts because it does 
not directly address the issue of whether the doctrine of strict liability 
should apply to used-product sellers.  Because most states have adopted 
section 402A instead of section 8, courts disagree about how to 
determine when strict liability should apply to a used-product seller. 
C. Public Policies Supporting the Imposition of Strict Liability 
Courts have relied predominately on four public policies to justify 
imposing strict liability on product manufacturers and sellers: enterprise 
liability, deterrence of risks associated with placing defective products 
into the stream of commerce, implied representation that products are 
safe for use, and consumer compensation.88 
                                                          
 82. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.1. 
 83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8(a). 
 84. Id. § 8(b). 
 85. Id. § 8(c). 
 86. Id. § 8(d). 
 87. OWEN, supra note 1, § 1.3. 
 88. See, e.g., Antonio J. Senagore, The Benefits of Limiting Strict Liability for Used-Product 
Sellers, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 349, 356–59 (2010) (discussing enterprise liability and efficient 
resource allocation, risk deterrence, implied representation and consumer expectation, and fairness 
and compensation); David B. Goodwin, Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used Products: Is Strict 
Liability for Commercial Sellers Desirable?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 535, 537–48 (1981) (discussing 
enterprise liability, market deterrence, compensation, and implied representation as strict liability 
policy justifications); Derrick Williams, Note, Secondhand Jurisprudence in Need of Legislative 
Repair: The Application of Strict Liability to Commercial Sellers of Used Goods, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN 
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1. Enterprise Liability 
Many courts have used the concept of enterprise liability as the main 
justification for imposing strict liability in products liability cases.89  The 
theory, in its most basic sense, is that “losses to society created or caused 
by an enterprise or . . . an activity[] ought to be borne by that enterprise 
or activity.”90  In other words, the price of a product should include and 
reflect the costs of possible accidents that might result from defects in 
that product.91  Imposing strict liability on product manufacturers forces 
them to price their products based on all of their expenses, which include 
costs of injuries resulting from the product as well as insurance to cover 
those costs.92  Consumers who purchase that product then bear that 
cost.93  This increased price “reflects the justifiable expectations of 
customers regarding safety, quality[,] and durability of new goods.”94 
This policy is meant to allocate resources by a product’s true cost to 
society and ultimately result in an “equitable spreading of risk between 
consumers and sellers.”95  This justification works well for 
manufacturing defects, which may occur only “intermittently.”96  The 
manufacturer may then spread the costs of that single accident over the 
production of a large number of units, which only minimally impacts the 
cost of that product.  Although this will lead to a slight increase in 
product prices, it will eventually force manufacturers to produce fewer 
dangerous goods because consumers will not buy the goods that cost 
more.97  This theory, however, does not work well to support imposing 
                                                                                                                       
L. REV. 255, 269–73 (2003) (same). 
 89. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co., 660 P.2d 
1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that enterprise liability is a basis for strict liability under 
Arizona law); Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 791 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (observing 
that the primary purpose of strict liability is “spreading throughout society the cost of compensating” 
injured consumers); Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Wis. 1991) (explaining 
that one policy justification for imposing strict liability is spreading the risk of losses to the 
manufacturer). 
 90. Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 
158 (1976) (citing O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915)). 
 91. Goodwin, supra note 88, at 537.  This is often referred to as “cost internalization.” 
 92. Turner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Senagore, supra note 88, at 357. 
 96. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (en 
banc) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 97. Senagore, supra note 88, at 357. 
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strict liability for design or warning defects, where generally each unit 
that was produced will have the same defect.  This theory ultimately 
supports the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers and sellers 
because it decreases the number of dangerous products that are available 
to consumers and encourages manufacturers and sellers to place safer 
products into the stream of commerce. 
2. Deterrence of Risks Associated with Placing Defective Products into 
the Stream of Commerce 
A second important policy justification behind strict liability is 
deterring manufacturers and sellers from placing defective products into 
the stream of commerce, thereby reducing the number of product-related 
injuries and the costs associated with them.98  The law also achieves this 
by incorporating the costs of accidents into the costs of manufacturing, 
which increases product costs and reduces consumer demand for 
dangerous goods.99  Increased potential for liability and higher costs 
create an economic incentive for manufacturers to make safer products100 
and, thus, support the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers and 
sellers.  Deterrence is fundamentally a rationale for simple negligence 
because the law cannot deter someone from causing a risk for something 
that no one knows exists, as is the case for many product defects. 
3. Implied Representation of Product Safety 
The implied representation justification for strict liability originates 
from the doctrine of implied warranty of merchantability for products.101  
This justification rests on the idea that when a manufacturer or seller 
places a product into the steam of commerce, it implies “that the product 
will be safe, if used as intended.”102  This protects consumers’ reasonable 
expectations of product safety and forces product manufacturers to 
guarantee the implicit safety of their products.103  Implied representation 
supports imposing strict liability on product manufacturers because they 
                                                          
 98. William L. Humes, Note, The Application of Strict Liability in Tort to the Retailers of Used 
Products: A Proposal, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 373, 393 (1991). 
 99. Senagore, supra note 88, at 358. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Goodwin, supra note 88, at 544. 
 102. Humes, supra note 98, at 395. 
 103. Williams, supra note 88, at 272–73. 
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have the ability to ensure that they produce safe products. 
4. Consumer Compensation 
Another policy justification behind strict liability is compensating 
injured parties.  Strict liability does not require the injured party to prove 
the manufacturer’s fault to win on a strict liability claim, making it easier 
for consumers to win compensation for injuries sustained from defective 
products.104  Requiring the manufacturer to insure against accidents 
caused by product defects can force all potential buyers to bear those 
costs instead of placing the burden on an individual accident victim.  
This policy alone would not support imposing strict liability, but as a 
matter of fairness to consumers, it is still a justification for strict 
liability.105 
D. Strict Liability for Used-Product Sellers: Courts Divided 
The current split concerning strict liability and used-product sellers 
results from different interpretations of section 402A.106  Section 402A 
does not directly address the issue of strict liability for used-product 
sellers.  The commentary that accompanies section 402A, however, has 
led most courts to agree on at least one point: that strict liability should 
apply only to sellers who are “in the business of selling products for use 
or consumption.”107 
Courts vary in the specific circumstances under which they have held 
used-product sellers strictly liable for defective products.108  One treatise 
explained strict liability as a recipe, stating that “every jurisdiction has its 
own special herbs, spices, and flavorings to differentiate its own version 
of strict liability from that of its neighbors . . . [and] given the dynamics 
of products liability common law, sometimes the mix of ingredients is 
changing.”109  The next two sections examine these divergent views. 
1. Majority View: Used-Product Sellers Are Not Subject to Strict 
                                                          
 104. See Humes, supra note 98, at 396. 
 105. Williams, supra note 88, at 272. 
 106. Senagore, supra note 88, at 361. 
 107. See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 108. See Bateman, supra note 4, § 24–28 (collecting cases). 
 109. LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.04 (1976). 
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Liability 
Most courts that have protected used-product sellers from strict 
liability for product defects have explained that strict liability is not 
justifiable unless the seller “repaired or modified the product, caused the 
defect, or made some representation regarding quality.”110  If the product 
is in the same condition as when the seller acquired it, then most courts 
will not apply strict liability.111  These decisions primarily rely on the 
fact that the underlying policy justifications for strict liability against 
product manufacturers do not justify holding used-product sellers strictly 
liable.112 
In 1979, the Oregon Supreme Court was one of the first courts to 
hold that strict liability should not apply to used-product sellers because 
there are no compelling public policy justifications for extending the 
doctrine from manufacturers and new-product sellers to used-product 
sellers.113  In Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., the court explained that 
extending strict liability to used-product sellers would not achieve the 
goals of fulfilling consumer expectations of safety or reducing the risks 
associated with defective products.114  With respect to consumer 
expectations of safety, the court observed that used-product sellers, 
although in the “business of selling [certain] goods,” generally do not 
make a “particular representation about their quality simply by offering 
them for sale.”115  The court further explained that if a buyer wanted 
                                                          
 110. Bateman, supra note 4. 
 111. See, e.g., King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93, 96 (7th Cir. 1997); Harber v. Altec Indus., 
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 961–65 (W.D. Mo.), aff’d, 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Keith v. 
Russell T. Bundy & Assocs., 495 So. 2d 1223, 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Peterson v. Lou 
Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 
403 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa 1987); Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac of Marlow Heights, Inc., 549 
A.2d 385, 392–93 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Gorath v. Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 441 N.W.2d 128, 131–
32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 906 N.E.2d 387, 394 (N.Y. 2009); 
Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv., Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 225–30 (Okla. 2001); Tillman v. Vance 
Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303–04 (Or. 1979). 
 112. Allenberg, 22 P.3d at 229–30; see also Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304 (finding that “the relevant 
policy considerations” are inapplicable to used-product sellers when the used-product seller did not 
make a representation of quality of the product beyond the sale itself or is not in a special position to 
influence the original manufacturer or others in the “chain of original distribution”). 
 113. Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1304. In Tillman, a defectively manufactured crane injured the 
plaintiff, who had purchased the twenty-four-year-old crane in “as is” condition from a used-
products seller.  Id. at 1300.  The court held that the used-product seller was not strictly liable in tort 
for the injuries caused by the crane.  Id. at 1304. 
 114. Id. at 1304. 
 115. Id. at 1303. 
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assurance that the product was of good quality, he could seek out a new-
product seller or dealer who “routinely” offers such goods rather than a 
used-goods dealer.116  The court concluded that used-product sales alone 
did not create the same “expectations of safety that courts have held are 
justifiably created by the introduction of a new product into the stream of 
commerce.”117 
In addressing how to reduce the risks often associated with sales of 
defective products, the Tillman court explained that new-product sellers 
will usually have some sort of relationship with manufacturers or 
distributors so that they can communicate safety concerns, whereas used-
product sellers “generally ha[ve] no direct relationship with either 
manufacturers or distributors.”118  Thus, the used-product seller does not 
have a direct “channel of communication” with the manufacturer or 
distributor to discuss “possible dangerous defects in particular product 
lines or . . . actual and potential liability claims.”119  The court also 
explained that used-product sellers generally have a difficult time 
obtaining indemnity for losses because of various statutes of limitations 
and problems that they often have in trying to locate an original 
manufacturer or distributor of a used product.120  The Oregon Supreme 
Court opined that this prevents used-product sellers, as contrasted with 
new-product sellers, from exerting the requisite financial pressure on 
manufacturers to encourage production of safer goods.121 
The rationale in Tillman persuaded many courts.  By 2001, at least 
four state supreme courts had followed Tillman explicitly and rejected 
plaintiffs’ attempts to impose strict liability on used-product sellers.122  
The California Courts of Appeal issued numerous decisions that relied on 
the same policy rationales as Tillman.123  In 2001, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that strict liability did not apply to the commercial 
                                                          
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1304 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 915 (Cal. 1995) (en banc); Peterson v. Idaho 
First Nat’l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303, 1304–06 (Idaho 1990); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 
403 N.W.2d 781, 784–85 (Iowa 1987); Allenberg v. Bentley Hedges Travel Serv., Inc., 22 P.3d 223, 
229–30 (Okla. 2001). 
 123. See, e.g., Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789, 796–98 (Ct. 
App. 1980) (finding that policy considerations do not support imposing strict liability on used-
product sellers); see also LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 231 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting 
that “Tauber-Aron’s reasoning is sound”). 
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seller of a used product who did not create the defect and who sold the 
product in basically the same condition as when it acquired the product 
for resale.124  It reasoned that the policy justifications that motivate strict 
liability are “not fully applicable to commercial sellers of used 
products”125 because used-product sellers, unlike manufacturers, are not 
the best party to protect against the risk of being injured by a defective 
product.126  The Third Restatement also adopts the majority rule, 
providing that a used-product seller is only liable under the 
circumstances set out in the Restatement.127 
2. Minority View: Used-Product Sellers Are Subject to Strictly 
Liability 
Some courts have found that used-product sellers are essentially the 
same as new-product sellers and should be held to the same standards as 
new-product sellers.128  One of the earliest cases finding that strict 
liability could be imposed on a used-product seller was Turner v. 
International Harvester Co. in 1975.129  The New Jersey Superior Court 
explained that a secondhand seller is strictly liable for injury caused by 
an unreasonably dangerous condition of a product because of a safety 
defect that was present in the vehicle when it was in the dealer’s 
control.130  It further observed that holding used-product sellers strictly 
liable would spread costs of possible damages and insurance to cover the 
damages among all consumers the same way that strict liability does for 
                                                          
 124. Allenberg, 22 P.3d at 225–26. 
 125. Id. at 229–30. 
 126. Id. at 230–31. 
 127. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 128. See, e.g., Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1218–21 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Gonzales v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829, 841–44 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Stillie v. AM Int’l, Inc., 
850 F. Supp. 960, 961–63 (D. Kan. 1994); Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing 
Supplies Co., 660 P.2d 1236, 1241–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Stanton v. Carlson Sales, Inc., 728 
A.2d 534, 540–43 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Turner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 68–73 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 16–19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1999); Thompson v. Rockford Mach. Tool Co., 744 P.2d 357, 364–66 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); 
Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518, 521–25 (Wis. 1991). 
 129. 336 A.2d at 72.  Turner involved a plaintiff whose husband had purchased a tractor in “as-
is” condition.  Id. at 65.  The plaintiff sued in strict liability, alleging that the tractor was defectively 
manufactured because the tractor collapsed onto her husband and killed him.  Id. at 66.  The court 
held that even though the plaintiff’s husband had purchased the tractor “as-is,” the used-product 
seller could be found strictly liable for the husband’s death.  Id. at 72. 
 130. Id. at 69. 
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new-product sellers.131  This would justify the reasonable consumer 
standards of “safety, quality[,] and durability” of used products.132  The 
Turner court explained that although other courts had suggested that 
consumers who purchase used products will have lower expectations of 
quality and durability, 
safety of the general public demands that when a used motor vehicle, 
for example, is sold for use as a serviceable motor vehicle (and not as 
junk parts), absent special circumstances, the seller be responsible for 
safety defects whether known or unknown at time of sale, present while 
the machine was under his control.133 
If courts were to hold otherwise, then consumers, along with the 
public, “bear[] the enterprise liability stemming from introduction of the 
dangerously defective used vehicle onto the public highways.”134  The 
court concluded with the firm statement that “[p]ublic policy demands 
that the buyer receive a used chattel safe for the purpose intended.”135  
The court further opined that “if a buyer wishes to contract away his 
right to protection, an unequivocal waiver of safety defects must be 
shown.”136  The Turner court reached an ill-founded conclusion because 
it failed to consider the fact that the used-product seller will likely have 
difficulty passing the costs to the original manufacturer. 
Other courts have held used-product sellers strictly liable for product 
defects to deter companies from manufacturing dangerous products.  The 
Arizona Court of Appeals, in Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane 
& Plumbing Supplies Co., reasoned that most used-product sellers could 
likely obtain indemnification from manufacturers of defective products, 
so strict liability was appropriate.137  In Jordan, the plaintiff purchased a 
used propane tank from the defendant.138  “The tank was sold without 
any guarantees or representations regarding its condition.”139  While the 
defendant’s serviceman filled the tank with propane, the hose 
disconnected, which caused the tank to explode and ultimately destroyed 
                                                          
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 70–71. 
 137. See 660 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
 138. Id. at 1237. 
 139. Id. 
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the plaintiff’s house.140  The court held that strict liability applied to the 
dealer of the used propane tank because the dealer, just like a new-
product dealer, profits from his business.141  Thus, the seller had a 
responsibility to maintain and to inspect the used tanks before selling 
them to innocent consumers.142  This holding, however, was based 
largely on section 402A of the Second Restatement.143  The court 
explained that, because section 402A does not distinguish between new- 
and used-product sellers, it applies to all sellers of defective products.144  
Its argument that subjecting used-product sellers to strict liability deters 
accidents is weak because a threat of liability cannot deter unknown 
risks.  The Jordan court reached the wrong conclusion.  Recently, the 
Kansas Supreme Court reached the same wrong conclusion. 
3. Kansas Adopts the Minority View: Used-Product Sellers Are Subject 
to Strict Liability After Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co. 
The Kansas Supreme Court recently decided a case involving a 
plaintiff who sued a used-product seller in strict liability.145  The case, 
Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co., involved a product liability 
action alleging negligence and strict liability for injuries to the buyer’s 
son caused by a used hay baler.146  The buyer purchased the used baler in 
“as is” condition,147 and the machine was missing a safety shield that 
would have been included when it was originally manufactured and 
sold.148  Because the baler was more than twenty years old, Rossville 
Truck & Tractor Company sold it for only $1,700.149  A new baler will 
generally cost in excess of $60,000.150  One week after the purchase, the 
baler malfunctioned and injured Gaumer’s arm.151  After suffering partial 
amputation of his arm, Gaumer claimed that the seller faced strict 
liability for selling a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous 
                                                          
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1240, 1242. 
 142. Id. at 1240. 
 143. See id. at 1241. 
 144. Id. at 1237–38. 
 145. Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co., 257 P.3d 292, 294 (Kan. 2011). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Brief of Appellee at 6, Gaumer, 257 P.3d 292 (No. 08-99990-A), 2008 WL 3461570 at *6. 
 150. Id. at *19. 
 151. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 294. 
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condition.152  The court held that Kansas law supports a strict liability 
claim against a seller of used goods.153 
The court in Gaumer supported its holding with three main 
arguments.  First, the legislature, in drafting the Kansas Product Liability 
Act (KPLA), chose to eliminate the language that would have excluded 
sellers of used goods from the definition of “product sellers.”154  
Additionally, the legislature included in the definition of “seller” those 
engaged in the business of selling products “whether the sale is for 
resale, or for use or consumption.”155  The court construed this legislative 
intent to support its holding.  Second, the court had previously used 
Brooks v. Dietz to adopt section 402A of the Second Restatement,156 
which does not distinguish between new and used products.157  Third, the 
court explained that allowing strict liability claims against used-product 
sellers would further the policy justifications that support the imposition 
of strict liability.158 
The court began its analysis with the KPLA, which states that a 
“[p]roduct liability claim” . . . includes, but is not limited to, any action 
previously based on: strict liability in tort, negligence; breach of 
express or implied warranty; breach of, or failure to, discharge a duty to 
warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation, 
concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent; or under 
any other substantive legal theory.159 
The court explained that the KPLA’s definition of a “product 
liability claim”—without additional language to describe its interplay 
with product liability common law in Kansas—was ambiguous and 
therefore required an analysis of the KPLA’s legislative history.160  The 
court compared the KPLA to the Modern Uniform Product Liability Act 
                                                          
 152. Id.  Gaumer additionally claimed that the seller was negligent by failing to warn about the 
potentially dangerous condition of the baler without the safety shield and by failing to inspect the 
baler before the sale to his father.  Id.  The court affirmed summary judgment on this claim.  Id. at 
295, 308. 
 153. Id. at 308. 
 154. Id. at 297, 303. 
 155. Id. at 297 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302(a) (2008)). 
 156. 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1976). 
 157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 300. 
 158. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 304–05. 
 159. Id. at 295 (alterations in original) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 160. Id. at 295–96. 
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(MUPLA) and found that the KPLA is essentially a less detailed version 
of the MUPLA.161  The KPLA, however, excluded used-product sellers 
from the definition of “product sellers” in its final amendment.162  
Therefore, the court concluded that it must rely on Kansas’s common law 
to determine whether a used-product seller should face strict liability.163  
The court also noted that two prior cases had relied on Kansas common 
law to supplement questions in products liability cases when the KPLA 
was “less than enlightening.”164  Additionally, other states with product 
liability statutes like the KPLA had “employ[ed] a blended approach” 
and combined the “application of statutory and common law.”165 
The court explained that Kansas has followed the doctrine of strict 
liability as it was set out in section 402A of the Second Restatement.166  
The court noted as significant that section 402A does not distinguish 
between sellers of new and used products.167  The court then looked to 
Kansas case law that has addressed strict liability claims.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court first adopted section 402A in Brooks v. Dietz and found 
that a court could hold a furnace manufacturer strictly liable for injuries 
that a repairman sustained when a furnace exploded based on the fact 
that the court considered the furnace a “dangerously defective 
product.”168  In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, the Kansas Supreme Court 
explained two purposes of strict liability.169  The first was to “achieve 
maximum protection for the injured party.”170  The second was to 
discourage the marketing of defective products that are a “menace to the 
public.”171  The Kennedy court also explained that strict liability extends 
only to the manufacturer and those in the “chain of distribution” of a 
product.172  It includes only those claims by “individuals to whom injury 
from a defective product may reasonably be foreseen” and applies only 
when the injured person was using the product for its intended 
                                                          
 161. Id. at 296. 
 162. Id. at 297. 
 163. Id. at 299. 
 164. Id. at 298 (citing Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 938 (Kan. 2000); Patton v. 
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1311–12 (Kan. 1993)). 
 165. Id. at 299. 
 166. Id. at 300. 
 167. Id. 
 168. 545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1976). 
 169. 618 P.2d 788, 794–95 (Kan. 1980). 
 170. Id. at 794. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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purpose.173  The Gaumer court also noted that in Kennedy the Kansas 
Supreme Court had not distinguished between sellers of new and used 
products.174 
The court further supported its decision by examining various policy 
arguments relating to the imposition of strict liability on used-product 
sellers.175  In addition to two of the policy considerations discussed 
previously—a desire to achieve maximum protection for the injured 
party and the promotion of “the public interest in discouraging the 
marketing of products that have defects that are a menace to the 
public”176—the court noted that Kansas has recognized a third policy 
justification: protecting consumer expectations.177  The Kansas Supreme 
Court, in Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., approved the “consumer 
expectations” test for when a product qualifies as defective.178  Comment 
i to section 402A outlines the consumer expectations test and states in 
part: 
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective 
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer. . . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who 
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community 
as to its characteristics.179 
The consumer expectations test180 is the formal test for defectiveness in 
Kansas.  After considering these policy reasons, the Gaumer court 
explained that they favor extending strict liability to sellers of used 
goods.181 
Gaumer recognized that a Kansas federal court predicted in Sell v. 
Bertsch & Co. that Kansas would not impose strict liability on sellers of 
used goods.182  Regardless, the Gaumer court asserted that the federal 
court’s interpretation of strict liability law and used-product sellers 
                                                          
 173. Id. (gathering cases).  For further explanation of the “chain of distribution” liability theory, 
see Wilcheck v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 552 P.2d 938, 942–43 (Kan. 1976). 
 174. Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co., 257 P.3d 292, 300 (Kan. 2011). 
 175. Id. at 303–05. 
 176. Id. (quoting Kennedy, 618 P.2d at 794); see also supra Part II.C.1–2. 
 177. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 300, 303. 
 178. 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982). 
 179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
 180. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 181. 257 P.3d at 303–04. 
 182. Id. (citing Sell v. Bertsch & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (D. Kan. 1984)). 
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“ignores our precedent and fails to acknowledge the elements we set 
forth for a strict liability claim.”183  Moreover, Sell did not consider the 
defenses available to used-product sellers in Kansas to defend against 
strict liability claims.184  This presumably would have changed the Sell 
court’s holding because it based its decision on the fact that a used-
product seller is outside the chain of distribution and, therefore, the 
purpose of strict liability to “discourage[] the marketing of defective 
products,” would not be furthered by extending strict liability to used-
product sellers.185  Ultimately, the Gaumer court found that there was no 
convincing argument against allowing strict liability claims against used-
product sellers in Kansas.186 
Lastly, the court addressed the policy considerations that Rossville 
Truck & Tractor had asserted against extending strict liability to used-
product sellers.187  The first was that strict liability would increase the 
cost of used goods, and the second was that these increased costs would 
drive used-product sellers out of business.188  The Kansas Supreme Court 
dismissed these arguments by pointing to the KPLA defense provided by 
Section 60-3306 of the Kansas Statutes.189  This defense, the court 
reasoned, “will often be well-suited for a defendant such as Rossville 
Truck & Tractor, a used-products seller of farm equipment that may not 
know the history of an item and has no duty to inspect for defects.”190  In 
conclusion, the court found that, although there are strong policy 
                                                          
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306 (2005). 
“A product seller shall not be subject to liability in a product liability claim arising from 
an alleged defect in a product, if the product seller establishes that: 
(a) [s]uch seller had no knowledge of the defect; 
(b) such seller in the performance of any duties the seller performed, or was required to 
perform, could not have discovered the defect while exercising reasonable care; 
(c) the seller was not a manufacturer of the defective product or product component; 
(d) the manufacturer of the defective product or product component is subject to service 
of process either under the laws of the state of Kansas or the domicile of the person 
making the product liability claim; and 
(e) any judgment against the manufacturer obtained by the person making the product 
liability claim would be reasonably certain of being satisfied.” 
Id. 
 185. Sell, 577 F. Supp. at 1399 (citing Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 794 (Kan. 
1980)). 
 186. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 303. 
 187. Id. at 304. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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implications for both sides, the legislature’s deliberate removal of 
language from the KPLA that would have differentiated between sellers 
of new and used products left the court “reluctant to deviate from its 
selected path.”191 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Gaumer was misguided.  
Exposing all used-product sellers to strict liability under all 
circumstances is inappropriate because policy considerations do not 
support this conclusion.  Instead, courts should follow the approach 
outlined in the Third Restatement, which provides a better method for 
determining when to allow strict liability claims against used-product 
sellers.  The court in Gaumer failed to consider the Third Restatement 
approach and misinterpreted Kansas legal precedent.  Gaumer should 
have been a negligence case, not a strict liability case.  Additionally, 
three of the policy considerations that have conventionally supported 
strict liability—enterprise liability, deterrence of risks associated with 
placing defective products into the stream of commerce, and implied 
representation of product safety—do not support imposing strict liability 
on all product sellers. 
This section first analyzes the reasoning and holding of Gaumer.  It 
then argues that courts should adopt the Third Restatement, as it provides 
a compromise for courts to follow in determining when to allow strict 
liability claims against used-product sellers.  Then, it examines the policy 
justifications supporting strict liability and concludes that these do not 
support imposing strict liability on used-product sellers. 
A. An Analysis of the Kansas Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Gaumer 
The court in Gaumer found it significant that the legislature, in 
drafting the KPLA, eliminated language that would have excluded sellers 
of used goods from the definition of “product sellers”192 and that section 
402A does not distinguish between sellers of new and used products.193  
The court should not have focused on the Second Restatement, but rather 
it should have considered section 8 of the Third Restatement.  Section 8, 
                                                          
 191. Id. at 304–05. 
 192. Id. at 303. 
 193. Id. 
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which superseded section 402A in 1998, synthesizes all of the changes in 
products liability law that have occurred since the publication of section 
402A.194  Although Kansas courts have rarely addressed the Third 
Restatement,195 the Kansas Supreme Court should look to the updated 
Restatement because it specifically addresses sales of used goods.  
Therefore, it is insignificant that neither section 402A nor the KPLA 
distinguishes between sellers of new and used goods. 
The Gaumer court also addressed prior Kansas cases that had 
outlined three purposes of strict liability—to protect injured parties, to 
discourage marketing of defective products,196 and to protect consumer 
expectations.197  These policies all generally support the doctrine of strict 
liability.  They are also furthered by the Third Restatement, which 
protects consumer expectations by imposing strict liability on sellers who 
sell a product in “like new” condition or a product that has been 
remanufactured so that a consumer can justifiably rely on it to be in safe, 
working order.198  The court purported to apply the “consumer 
expectations” test in Gaumer.199  This requires that the product sold be 
more dangerous than an ordinary consumer with common knowledge 
would have contemplated when he bought it.200  The baler at issue in 
Gaumer, however, simply lacked a safety shield.201  It was not 
technically defective because its lacking a safety shield should have been 
obvious to the purchaser.  Gaumer should have been a simple negligence 
case.  If the court had wanted to ensure that used-product dealers do not 
sell products that are missing an important piece, such as the safety 
shield in this case, it should have applied the negligence standard to the 
case.  There was no need to allow a strict liability claim against Rossville 
Truck & Tractor.  Section 8 of the Third Restatement would have 
protected Gaumer because it allows a negligence claim against a party 
who fails to exercise reasonable care by creating a defect or allowing a 
defect to remain when reasonable care would have eliminated it.202 
                                                          
 194. See supra Part II.B. 
 195. See, e.g., Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000) (refusing to adopt section 
2 of the Third Restatement). 
 196. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 303 (citing Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 796 (Kan. 
1980)). 
 197. Id. (citing Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982)). 
 198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8(b), (c) (1998). 
 199. 257 P.3d at 303. 
 200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
 201. 257 P.3d at 294. 
 202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8(a). 
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The Gaumer court also looked to Brooks,203 a prior case in which the 
Kansas Supreme Court had allowed a strict liability claim for a defective 
furnace that had exploded.204  It also relied on Kennedy and noted that it 
had not distinguished between new and used products.205  Neither case, 
however, provides help for the court in Gaumer.  Brooks is irrelevant 
because, as discussed above, the court should not have considered the 
baler to be a dangerously defective product.  Although it lacked a safety 
shield, this fact does not automatically make it “defective.”  Kennedy is 
also irrelevant because that court’s failure to distinguish between new 
and used products does not imply any intent on behalf of the Kansas 
Supreme Court—whether the product in Kennedy was new or used was 
not at issue in the case.206  Therefore, it is not significant that the court 
did not distinguish between the two. 
The Gaumer court also referenced the Sell court’s prediction that 
Kansas would not impose strict liability on sellers of used goods.207  The 
Gaumer court, however, stated that the federal court’s interpretation of 
strict liability law and used-product sellers “ignores our precedent and 
fails to acknowledge the elements we set forth for a strict liability 
claim.”208  This argument does not make sense, however, because the 
court cites Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., a case in which the Kansas 
Supreme Court simply outlines the elements required for a strict liability 
claim.209  Mays is not controlling precedent for the issue of strict liability 
set forth in Gaumer. 
The court also opined that Rossville Truck & Tractor could take 
advantage of the KPLA defense outlined in section 60-3306 of the 
Kansas Statutes.210  This defense allows a seller to escape liability when 
it did not manufacture the defective product.211  This defense, however, 
would not protect a seller like Rossville Truck & Tractor for two reasons.  
First, sellers of products where there is a significant period of time 
between the original sale and the sale of the used product will likely be 
                                                          
 203. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 300–02 (citing Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976)). 
 204. Brooks, 545 P.2d at 1106. 
 205. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 300 (citing Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1982)). 
 206. Kennedy, 618 P.2d at 788.  The product at issue was herbicide that had poisoned cows.  Id. 
at 791. 
 207. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 303 (citing Sell v. Bertsch & Co., 577 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (D. Kan. 
1984)). 
 208. Id. (citing Mays v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 661 P.2d 348, 360 (Kan. 1983)). 
 209. Mays, 661 P.2d at 360. 
 210. Gaumer, 257 P.3d at 303. 
 211. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3306(b) (2005). 
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unable to pass the costs of injuries up the chain of distribution to the 
original manufacturer.  Second, the defect in Gaumer came into 
existence after the baler left the original manufacturer’s possession—it 
was a prior owner presumably removed it at some point.212  Therefore, 
the court inaccurately concluded that this defense would be ideal for 
sellers like Rossville Truck & Tractor. 
In sum, the Gaumer court’s conclusion that there was not a 
convincing argument against allowing strict liability claims against 
secondhand sellers in Kansas was ill-founded and based on arguments 
that do not support its conclusion. 
B. Courts Should Adopt Section 8 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability 
Most jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of strict liability and 
have followed the version outlined in the Second Restatement.213  
Section 402A, however, does not directly address the applicability of 
strict liability to used-product sellers.  The ALI published it in 1964, and 
many unique problems have arisen in products liability law in the last 
four decades. 
In 1998, the ALI published the Third Restatement with the intention 
of revising and updating the Second Restatement.214  The Third 
Restatement directly addresses liability of sellers or distributors of 
defective used products215 and was meant to essentially supersede the 
Second Restatement and provide a comprehensive “reformulation and 
expansion of [section] 402A” and of products liability law generally.216  
The ALI wrote the Third Restatement to respond to products liability 
questions “that have become points of serious contention in the courts 
but were not part of the products liability landscape when the earlier 
provision was adopted in 1964.”217 
The Third Restatement is a synthesis of all the case law that has 
developed since 1964218 and is meant to provide practitioners with new 
                                                          
 212. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 149, at *6. 
 213. OWEN, supra note 1, § 5.3. 
 214. Publications Catalog, AM. LAW INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
publications.ppage&node_id=54 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 (1998). 
 216. Publications Catalog, supra note 214. 
 217. Id. 
 218. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 reporters’ note, summary. 
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information and guidance that will allow them to analyze complex 
products liability issues with greater sophistication.219  It essentially 
“limits recovery from a seller of a defective product who resells the 
product without making any substantial change to it or any representation 
as to its quality to negligence standards.”220  Section 8 allows strict 
liability claims when a seller represents a product as being “like new” or 
when the seller has reconditioned, remanufactured, or repaired the 
product.221  It is appropriate for consumers to hold manufacturers and 
sellers strictly liable under these circumstances because consumers who 
purchase products that have been reconditioned or are in “like new” 
condition will have higher expectations concerning the quality and safety 
of that product. 
The first provision, subsection (a), provides a negligence standard 
and allows a person injured by a used product to bring a negligence 
claim if he can show that the seller failed to exercise reasonable care by 
creating a defect or allowing a defect to remain when reasonable care 
would have eliminated it.222  The standard outlined in the first provision 
provides the fallback standard for injuries caused by a defective product.  
Used-product sellers are properly subject to liability claims when their 
negligence causes harm to a buyer.223  Consumers’ expectations of 
quality and safety are much lower for used products than they are for 
new products.224  Regardless, buyers still have a right to expect that a 
used-product seller will exercise reasonable care in distributing a 
product.225  This provision should have governed Gaumer.  If it had, 
Rossville Truck & Tractor would have had to prove that it had acted 
reasonably in selling the baler without the safety shield and in “as-is” 
condition. 
The second provision, subsection (b), provides a strict liability 
standard and allows a person injured by a used product to hold a party 
strictly liable if the product that caused the injury had a manufacturing 
defect and the seller marketed the product in a way that would cause a 
reasonable consumer to believe that the product was in “like new” 
                                                          
 219. Publications Catalog, supra note 214. 
 220. Frey v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 734 A.2d 1, 20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). 
 221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8(b), (c). 
 222. Id. § 8(a) & cmts. b & e. 
 223. Id. § 8 cmt. b. 
 224. See discussion infra Part III.C.4. 
 225. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 8 cmt. b. 
NELSON FINAL.doc 8/2/2012  11:37 AM 
2012] STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST USED-PRODUCT SELLERS 1207 
condition.226  In Gaumer, however, there was no manufacturing defect—
at some point within the twenty-one-year period between the time the 
baler was manufactured and resold, the safety shield was removed.  
Additionally, Rossville Truck & Tractor did not market the baler in a 
way that would lead a reasonable consumer to believe that it was in “like 
new” condition because it was obviously lacking the safety shield and 
was sold “as-is.” 
The third provision, subsection (c), also provides a strict liability 
standard and allows a consumer to bring a claim against a seller who has 
remanufactured a product that has a defect that ultimately injures a 
consumer.227  The defects under subsection (c) “include manufacturing 
defects, design defects, and defects based on inadequate instructions and 
warnings.”228  This provision means that used-product sellers would 
incur liability for these types of defects the same way that the seller or 
manufacturer of a new product would. 229  This, however, would not 
apply in Gaumer because Rossville Truck & Tractor did nothing to 
restore or remanufacture the baler. 
The last provision, subsection (d), essentially provides that a failure 
by a manufacturer or seller to comply with a product safety statute or 
regulation will subject it to liability for injuries caused by the product.230  
This provision is not applicable in Gaumer, though it might provide for a 
more effective and efficient approach to the issue of used-product safety.  
A regulatory body could outline with some precision those safety matters 
that a used-product seller must satisfy before making a sale.  An 
industry-specific statute or regulation that provides guidance to used-
product sellers would instruct such sellers as to the required, pre-sale 
improvements.  This approach would make sense for used products that 
are sold frequently and could have serious safety concerns, such as used 
cars. 
The Third Restatement provides a theory of limited strict liability for 
used-product manufacturers and sellers, which is a reasonable 
compromise for courts to adopt and follow.  It satisfies consumers’ 
reasonable expectations for used products that they purchase by 
imposing strict liability under subsections (b) and (c).  Courts should 
                                                          
 226. Id. § 8(b) & cmts. b, f & g. 
 227. Id. § 8(c). 
 228. Id. § 8 cmt. b. 
 229. See id. § 8(c) & cmts. b & i. 
 230. Id. § 8(d). 
NELSON FINAL.doc 8/2/2012  11:37 AM 
1208 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
look to the Third Restatement when analyzing products liability claims 
against used-product sellers because it provides much needed guidance 
to help courts determine those circumstances under which used-product 
sellers should incur strict liability.  The Third Restatement limits strict 
liability across the board because policy considerations that generally 
support the theory of strict liability do not equally support the conclusion 
that all secondhand sellers should face strict liability. 
C. Public Policies that Support the Imposition of Strict Liability Against 
Manufacturers Do Not Similarly Support the Imposition of Strict 
Liability Against Used-Product Sellers 
1. Enterprise Liability 
The theory of enterprise liability does not apply to used-product 
sellers.  Some courts have recognized that the theory allows used-product 
sellers, along with new-product sellers, to distribute their costs of doing 
business to consumers which will reflect consumer expectations of 
“safety, quality[,] and durability of used goods.”231  This theory works 
well for manufacturers and sellers of new products.232  With new 
products, the manufacturer may determine the price of the product and 
add costs to the sales price to pay for future strict liability claims.233  
Used-product sellers, however, are generally much smaller businesses 
than manufacturers and new-product sellers, and they cannot easily 
distribute the costs of doing business to insure against possible injuries 
that result from their products.  New-product manufacturers and sellers, 
who have the ability to reduce risks that defective products create, must 
bear the costs to do so.  Used-product sellers generally do not have the 
financial ability to pass on excess costs to consumers to insure against 
possible injuries because they are in the business of selling used goods at 
low prices.  Such sellers tend to “pitch low prices” to attract buyers who 
are “looking for the best parlay of quality and low price but are 
consciously trading off the quality to get the price.”234  If these sellers 
were subject to strict liability claims, then they would have to increase 
the prices of their goods, which in turn could eventually drive them out 
                                                          
 231. Turner v. Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975). 
 232. Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 961 (W.D. Mo.), aff’d 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
 233. Id. 
 234. LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 233–34 (Ct. App. 1981). 
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of business.235  Used-product sellers are also not in the best position to 
pass costs back to the original manufacturer—it is nearly impossible for 
the seller to establish that a defect in a product was present when it left 
the manufacturer’s possession. 
If used-product sellers were to bear the costs of strict liability claims, 
then their ability to sell used products at reduced costs would diminish 
significantly.  If used products were priced the same as or close to the 
same as new products, then no rational consumer would buy the used 
product over the new one.  Imposing strict liability on used-product 
sellers could, in theory, wipe out the entire secondhand market and, 
therefore, is not sound policy. 
2. Deterrence of Risks Associated with Placing Defective Products into 
the Stream of Commerce 
This policy justification does not support subjecting used-product 
sellers to strict liability because they are not directly involved in the 
initial manufacturing, marketing, or distributing process and likely have 
no relationship with the original seller or manufacturer of a product.236  
Used-product sellers would have to bear the entire risk and costs of 
injuries on their own.  This justification supports holding manufacturers 
of new products strictly liable for injuries because the manufacturer has 
the ability to repair or stop manufacturing a dangerous or defective 
product.  Used-product sellers, on the other hand, do not generally have a 
“ready channel of communication . . . [to] exchange information about 
possible dangerous defects” with manufacturers or distributors.237  Used-
product sellers cannot always easily locate the original seller or 
manufacturer or, for older products, cannot identify the original 
manufacturer or seller.  They also face problems with manufacturers and 
sellers that go out of business or with indemnity claims falling outside of 
state statutes of limitation.238  Used-product sellers would have to 
overcome all of these hurdles to recover compensation from the original 
manufacturer or seller if the used-product seller incurred strict liability. 
                                                          
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 231. 
 237. Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979). 
 238. Id. (stating that problems used-product sellers face with claims for indemnity include 
“statutes of limitation and the increasing difficulty as time passes of locating a still existing and 
solvent manufacturer”). 
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Additionally, if used-product sellers were responsible for inspecting 
products for defects and insuring against all defects irrespective of their 
ability to discover them, then they “would in effect become an insurer 
against defects [that] had come into existence after the chain of 
distribution was completed, and while the product was under the control 
of one or more consumers.”239  For example, in a case involving an axle 
shift that had weakened from heat exposure and eventually failed, an 
injured consumer sued a salvage dealer claiming strict liability.240  The 
dealer had not disassembled or inspected the axle prior to selling it, and 
the court held that the dealer would have had no way to discover this 
defect because it “could only have been discovered by a skilled 
metallurgist.”241  For cases such as this, imposing an obligation on used-
product sellers would be far too burdensome and costly for them to 
handle.  It is unrealistic to expect used-product sellers to have the ability 
or resources to perform extensive inspections of all of their products.  It 
is rare for used-product sellers to have “anything comparable to a factory 
reconditioning process”242 because they generally tend to sell a small 
number of many different types of products. 
The justification of risk deterrence ultimately does not support strict 
liability for used-product sellers because it would not achieve the goal of 
reducing the risk of dangerous products being put into the stream of 
commerce.  Rather, it would likely lead to increased costs of used goods. 
3. Implied Representation of Product Safety 
Manufacturers who make products and place them into the stream of 
commerce “impliedly represent their goods as safe for intended use.”243  
This policy justification protects consumer beliefs that the products they 
purchase are safe for use.244  When someone buys a new product, he 
assumes that the product is safe for use.  When someone buys a used 
product in “as is” condition or without any guarantee of the product’s 
                                                          
 239. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ill. 1975) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965)). 
 240. Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781, 781–82 (Iowa 1987). 
 241. Id. at 782, 785.  The court refused to extend strict liability to the used-product seller for 
latent defects that arose while the goods were in the possession of the previous owner.  Id. at 785. 
 242. LaRosa v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 234 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 243. Thompson v. Rockford Mach. Tool Co., 744 P.2d 357, 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
Hall v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 692 P.2d 787, 791 (Wash. 1984) (en banc)). 
 244. See Humes, supra note 98, at 395. 
NELSON FINAL.doc 8/2/2012  11:37 AM 
2012] STRICT LIABILITY AGAINST USED-PRODUCT SELLERS 1211 
quality, there is no similar implied representation by the seller that the 
product is safe for use.  Consumers pay much less for used products 
because they understand that these products may not last as long as or 
work as well as new ones.245  This policy justifies subjecting new-
product manufacturers and sellers to strict liability claims because it 
forces them to guarantee the safety of their products.  It does not, 
however, support the argument that used-product sellers should inspect 
and repair their products before selling them, as it would be very costly 
and consumers who purchase secondhand goods do not have the same 
kinds of expectations in terms of quality or safety of those products.246  
Further, consumers who purchase new goods expect that the product they 
buy, which is likely priced higher than a comparable used product, will 
be safe and of good quality.  The cheaper price of a used product should 
lower a consumer’s expectations of quality.  Therefore, a buyer who 
chooses to purchase a used product generally should have much lower 
expectations than a buyer who chooses to purchase a similar new 
product. 
The used-product market is vastly different from the new-product 
market because it “operate[s] on the apparent understanding that the 
seller . . . makes no particular representation about [a product’s] quality 
by simply offering [it] for sale.”247  Therefore, when a consumer 
purchases a used product, he should not expect that it is in good 
condition or that it is working properly.  The used-product market gives 
sellers and consumers a great amount of flexibility in terms of pricing 
and representations of quality.248  If a consumer wanted to assure that the 
purchased product was of good quality, then he could ask the seller to 
make a guarantee of quality or a warranty to that effect.249  If a used-
product seller guarantees the quality or safety of a product, then 
imposing strict liability on that seller if the product injures a consumer 
                                                          
 245. Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 964 (W.D. Mo.), aff’d, 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
 246. See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303–04 (Or. 1979); see also Turner v. 
Int’l Harvester Co., 336 A.2d 62, 69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (consumer expectations of 
“safety, quality[,] and durability of used goods” are not the same for used goods as they are for new 
goods). 
 247. Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1303. 
 248. Wilkinson v. Hicks, 179 Cal. Rptr. 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 249. See Tillman, 596 P.2d at 1303–04 (stating that “[i]f a buyer wants some assurance of 
quality, he typically either bargains for it in the specific transaction or seeks out a dealer who 
routinely offers it”); see also Wilkinson, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 8. 
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would adequately protect reasonable consumer expectations.250  In all 
other circumstances, such as when a product is sold in “as is” condition 
without any representation of quality or safety, strict liability is 
inappropriate because consumers could not reasonably expect that the 
product is safe for use.  In Gaumer, the price of the baler and the fact that 
it was sold in “as is” condition made it clear to Gaumer that Rossville 
Truck & Tractor did not imply that the baler was safe for use.  It is 
unlikely that any reasonable consumer would assume that Rossville 
Truck & Tractor impliedly represented that a baler that was originally 
sold twenty-one years ago was safe.  As more time passes between the 
original sale and the resale, an inference of safety should continually 
weaken and eventually disappear. 
4. Consumer Compensation 
Consumers injured by defective products are “powerless to protect 
themselves”251 and should not have to bear the costs associated with 
injuries caused by a defective product.  This policy justification supports 
holding both new- and used-product sellers strictly liable for injuries 
caused by their products because innocent victims should receive 
compensation for their injuries.  If manufacturers did not face strict 
liability for selling defective products, then victims would not receive 
compensation and manufacturers would unfairly profit from selling 
defective products to consumers without being held accountable or 
facing any ramifications. 
The consumer compensation justification has been particularly 
important because of a recent increase in used-product sales.252  Sales at 
pawnshops, antique stores, and other secondhand shops grew twice as 
fast as other retailers,253 presumably those that sell brand-new products.  
The rise of eBay and the economic slowdown has seen [secondhand] 
goods reach new heights of popularity.”254  Since the financial crisis of 
                                                          
 250. Strict liability has been imposed on sellers under similar circumstances.  See, e.g., Crandell 
v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 32, 35–36 (S.D. 1983) (imposing strict liability on 
seller of a dryer that was “[g]uaranteed” to be a “[q]uality [r]econditioned [u]nit” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 251. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (en banc). 
 252. Leslie Kaufman, They Can Get It for You Resale; Secondhand Stores Moving into the Retail 
Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at C1 (noting that in 1997 “Americans spent some $12 
billion on merchandise bought at these secondhand stores, about a 30 percent jump from 1992”). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Louise Jack, From Rags to Riches, MARKETING WK. (Sept. 3, 2009), 
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2008, however, consumers have been spending less and less money.  The 
downturn of the U.S. economy has led consumers to spend less money 
on new goods and search out deals from used-product dealers, such as 
consignment shops, thrift stores, garage sales, and online used-good 
retailers.255  Consumers who suffer from product-related injuries are 
often unable to afford the consequences of those injuries, such as the 
overwhelming costs associated with health and medical bills and loss of 
time.256  Because of this, one may argue that consumers need protection 
regardless of the fact that they chose to purchase a used product rather 
than a new one. 
When a person purchases a used product, however, the general rule 
is caveat emptor—the buyer of used goods essentially must be “willing 
to take his or her chances in exchange for a cheaper price.”257  Therefore, 
although this policy justification supports subjecting used-product sellers 
to strict liability, it is not, by itself, sufficient to impose liability on these 
sellers because the costs that they would incur from paying consumers 
for injuries would eventually drive them out of business and would 
ultimately do nothing to reduce the risks associated with defective 
products being placed into the stream of commerce.258 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Gaumer v. Rossville Truck 
& Tractor Co., allowing a strict liability action against the seller of a 
used product,259 was misguided.  Exposing used-product sellers to strict 
liability claims under all circumstances is inappropriate because the 
policy considerations that have traditionally supported strict liability do 
not similarly support imposing strict liability on secondhand dealers and 
used-product sellers.  Instead, the Gaumer court should have followed 
section 8 of the Third Restatement, which outlines a more 
comprehensive and logical approach for courts to use in deciding when 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/from-rags-to-riches/3003993.article. 
 255. See Sandra Block & Barbara Hagenbaugh, Downturn Has More Folks Stashing Their Cash, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 2008, at B1. 
 256. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (en banc) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
 257. Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 964 (W.D. Mo.), aff’d 5 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
 258. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 259. Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co., 257 P.3d 292, 308 (Kan. 2011). 
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to subject used-product sellers to strict liability.  It provides a 
compromise and allows strict liability claims when they are justified 
under the circumstances, but it includes a negligence provision that 
applies when strict liability is inappropriate.  Under section 8, Gaumer 
should have been a simple negligence case.  If the Gaumer court wanted 
to ensure that used-product sellers do not sell products that are missing 
an important piece or that are not safe for use, then it should have applied 
the negligence standard.  This way, Rossville Truck & Tractor would 
have had the opportunity to establish that it had acted reasonably in 
selling the baler in “as is” condition without the safety shield rather than 
immediately facing strict liability. 
Additionally, the policy justifications behind strict liability do not 
support its imposition on used-product sellers across the board.  These 
sellers are not directly involved with the initial distribution process for 
products and generally have no direct relationship with the original 
manufacturer and no way to influence the manufacturer to produce safer 
products.  And if used-product sellers were required to inspect and repair 
all of their used products, then they would be forced to increase the 
prices of their products.  This, in turn, would frustrate the purpose of the 
secondhand market.  Therefore, it is appropriate for courts to follow 
section 8 of the Third Restatement and allow only a limited theory of 
strict liability for used-product sellers. 
